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Abstract 
Public education expenditure varies significantly across Indian states. Using data on sixteen Indian 
states from 2001-2010, the paper tries to identify the determinants of per capita education expenditure 
of state governments in India. The econometric findings indicate that richer states spend more on 
education compared to the poorer states. A lower share of child population (0-14 years) is found to 
significantly enhance education expenditure at the state level. We do not find any evidence that 
political factors such as political ideology of the ruling party and level of corruption affect education 
expenditure of state governments. 
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1. Introduction 
Education has long been regarded as one of the prime drivers of growth. Over time, many 
economic growth theories and models (such as Romer, 1990 and Lucas, 1988) have 
developed relating education and economic growth. The justification for higher government 
expenditure on education is based on its impact on economic growth and long-term increase 
in the expected income of individuals (see Levine and Renelt, 1992; Mankiw et al., 1992; 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Duflo, 2001; Mukherjee, 2007). From the perspective of 
education as a fundamental right, the case for public intervention in the education sector 
becomes even stronger, especially for developing countries like India.  
India is a federal republic with 28 states and 7 union territories. After independence, the 
Constitution of India recognised education as a state subject. Though it was transferred to 
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concurrent list (i.e. concurrent with the central government or centre) in 1976, yet the main 
responsibility of financing education still rested on the state governments. 
Table 1: Share of Centre’s and States’ Expenditure in Total Public Expenditure on 
Education 
Year Share of 
States 
Share of 
Centre 
1990 88.3 11.7 
1995 85.7 14.3 
2000 87.3 12.7 
2005 81.1 18.9 
2010 77.8 22.2 
Source: Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure on Education (Various Issues), Ministry of Human Resource 
Development, Government of India. 
Note: Includes both Plan and Nonplan expenditure2 
 
However, there is a lot of disparity within states in terms of expenditure on education by the 
respective state governments. In Table 2, we rank the 16 Indian states used in our 
econometric analysis according to their respective per capita public education expenditure 
(Column 3) and Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) per capita (Column 5) in 2010. 
Hypothetically speaking, we would expect that richer states spend more on education 
compared to the poorer states. Overall, the rankings achieved by the states conform to that 
belief. High-income states such as Haryana, Kerala and Maharashtra have some of the 
highest investments in education in India. But, there are exceptions too. Assam, despite being 
a low-income state (ranked 13th out of the 16 states) ranks very high in terms of education 
spending. Himachal Pradesh ranks 1st in terms of per capita spending but does not come even 
among the richest five states.3Some of the richest states like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat register 
a mediocre performance when it comes to state spending on education. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Plan expenditure is that part of the total budgeted expenditure which is meant for financing various education 
schemes and programmes proposed under Five year plans. It indicates the direction of changes in the education 
sector. Nonplan expenditure is the expenditure on operating and maintaining existing education infrastructure. 
The central government, over time, came to play an increasingly dominant role in shaping the country’s 
education system. This led to a steady rise in the central government’s Plan expenditure share, from around 40% 
in the early 1990s to around 63% in 2003. This, in turn, explains the increase in its share in total public 
education expenditure from 18.9% in 2005 to 22.2% in 2010. The state governments are primarily concerned 
with the Nonplan expenditure in the education sector which implies that it is the policies of the centre which 
shapes India’s education system. See De and Endow (2008) for more details. 
3It is possible that Assam and Himachal are exceptions because of their size and it is easy for these states to 
spend more than the larger states because of their low population. Himachal Pradesh is the least populated state 
(ranked 16th) among all the 16 states included in the study and Assam is ranked 13th (Census of India, 2011). 
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Table 2: Ranking the States by Per Capita Public Education Expenditure and NSDP 
per capita in 2010-11 
State Per Capita Public 
Education Expenditure 
(INR) 
Rank Real NSDP per capita 
(INR) 
Rank 
Top five states in terms of education expenditure (Ranks 1-5) 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
2314.4 1 36327.66 6 
Haryana 1543.6 2 49945.90 1 
Maharashtra 1479.2 3 39602.34 4 
Assam 1404.9 4 18734.02 13 
Kerala 1163.3 5 41203.87 2 
Middle Ranked States (Ranks 6-11) 
Karnataka 1097.5 6 29279.9 9 
Punjab 1056.6 7 36287.7 7 
Tamil Nadu 1048.3 8 36417.6 5 
Orissa 1047.9 9 18935.4 12 
Gujarat 1015.3 10 40244.1 3 
Rajasthan 984.4 11 23304.3 11 
Bottom five states (Ranks 12-16) 
West Bengal 929.4 12 28486.34 10 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
896.4 13 30719.32 8 
Uttar Pradesh 723.6 14 15501.40 15 
Bihar 625.9 15 12068.39 16 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
621.4 16 16739.98 14 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on data from State Finances (Various Issues), Reserve Bank of India. 
 Note: Assigned ranking is based on the performance of the sixteen states included in the sample. NSDP per 
capita is at 1999 constant prices and per capita public education expenditure is at 2001 constant prices. 
 
Over the span of a decade (2001-2010), the ranking of the states on the basis of education 
expenditure have not changed substantially; the only exception being Haryana which jumps 
from the 8th position in 2001 to 2nd position in 2010 (see Table 3). However, Haryana was 
also the richest Indian state in 2010. Among the low-income states, only Orissa (with a NSDP 
per capita only higher than Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh in 2010) does slightly 
better to move up from the worst performers’ group into the middle category (ranks 6th-11th).  
The worst performing states of West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh 
continued to remain at the bottom of the ranks.  
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Table 3: Ranking of states by Per capita Education Expenditure in 2001 and 2010 
State Edurank_2001 Edurank_2010 
Himachal Pradesh 1 1 
Assam 2 4 
Kerala 3 5 
Punjab 4 7 
Maharashtra 5 3 
Tamil Nadu 6 8 
Gujarat 7 10 
Haryana 8 2 
Karnataka 9 6 
Rajasthan 10 11 
Andhra Pradesh 11 13 
West Bengal 12 12 
Orissa 13 9 
Uttar Pradesh 14 14 
Bihar 15 15 
Madhya Pradesh 16 16 
Note: Authors’ own calculations based on data from State Finances (Various Issues), Reserve Bank of India. 
EDURANK refers to ranking assigned on the basis of education expenditure per head by the state governments. 
 
So, in this paper, we ask: what are the factors that determine the level of education 
expenditure by state governments? We focus on the state level because a) as seen in Table 1, 
the majority of the investments in education in India are carried out by the state governments; 
and b) education policies differ between states and hence a study at the aggregate level will 
miss the dynamics at work at the sectoral level.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 discusses the econometric models used in the study and Section 4 presents and 
interprets the results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Overview of the literature  
 
A review of the existing literature reveals that determinants of public education expenditure 
go beyond the economic factors; demographic and political determinants too play a 
significant role.  
2.1 Economic Factors 
The public expenditure-economic growth link was first postulated by the German political 
economist Adolf Wagner (Lamartina and Zaghini, 2010). Wagner’s Law (also known as the 
law of increasing state spending) states that the growth in real income would lead to an 
increase in public welfare expenditure (which includes education expenditure). Wagner 
hypothesises that demand for services by the citizens is income-elastic and hence, as 
economic conditions improve, the demand for social and cultural goods also rises. Economic 
factors are also important because they represent some of the budget constraints that a 
government faces while allocating resources. 
The positive effect of economic factors on public education expenditure in India is well-
documented in the previous studies. Using panel data for 15 Indian states from 1992-93 to 
1997-98, Roy et al. (2000) attempts to estimate the determinants of public expenditure on 
primary, secondary and higher education. The paper finds that rich states spend more on 
education compared to poorer states. Chakrabarti and Joglekar (2006) explore the 
government financing of education over a span of 1980-81 to 1999-2000 across 15 major 
states of India and found that states with higher per capita income spent more on education.4 
2.2 Demographic Factors 
The effect of demographic characteristics on education expenditure is slightly 
ambiguous.5Mehrotra (2004), in India’s context, states that even if some backward states 
attach high priority to education, larger number of school-going children probably reduces 
their per capita spending on education. However, it can also be the case that a state with a 
larger child population is spending more on education than a state with ageing population 
because the former has the incentive to reap the benefits of a potential demographic dividend. 
                                                          
4 Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) report a similar relationship between per capita state income and 
developmental expenditure for Indian states. 
5  See Cutler et al. (1993) for a detailed discussion on the theoretical relationship between demographic 
characteristics and public spending.   
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The international literature on the issues of demographic characteristics and public education 
expenditure can be broadly categorised into two groups. One group of papers analyse the 
potential competition between the elderly and younger segments of the population for public 
resources. The other group examines the link between size of the young population and 
education finance (Grob and Wolter, 2005).  
2.2.1 Intergenerational Conflict in the context of Public Education Expenditure 
It is generally assumed that an individual’s preference for a public service is determined by 
whether that person is likely to be a direct user of the service. This implies that different 
groups of voters compete for shares of the public budget and a rising share of elderly voters 
in the population should hypothetically lead to a fall in public education expenditure. That is 
because the needs of elderly people differ from that of the younger population and, 
consequently, the former will prefer higher investments in areas (other than education) which 
benefit them directly.  
The international evidence is quite mixed on this issue.  Using panel data for the states of the 
United States for 1960–1990, Poterba (1997) finds that an increase in the share of elderly 
residents in a jurisdiction is associated with a signiﬁcant reduction in per-child educational 
spending. Harris et al. (2001) also find that a growing share of elderly at the state level tends 
to depress state spending on education in United States. Many European studies such as 
Borge and Rattsø (1995), Grob and Wolter (2005) and Borge and Rattsø (2008) report similar 
negative relationship for Norway, Switzerland and Denmark respectively. On the other hand, 
there are studies which refute this claim. Strömberg (1998) argues that altruism can reduce 
intergenerational conflicts.  Duncombe et al. (2003) say that majority of studies on this issue 
have used aggregate data that do not provide speciﬁc evidence on preferences of elderly 
people, and assume that all elders are similar in their views. They find that elderly with 
grandchildren are more likely to support school spending than those without.  
2.2.2 Size of Young Population and Public Education Expenditure 
Most empirical studies find that it is a disadvantage to be part of a large cohort. This is 
understandable since cost of providing education increases with the increase in student 
population. The government has to spend more on building schools, employ additional 
teachers and give more aid. Using data on 48 US states from 1960-2000, She (2004) finds 
that percentage of young population (aged 5 to 17 years) has a negative impact on education 
spending. This finding is consistent with other major studies on US in this field such as 
Porterba (1997) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1997). This finding gets support in many 
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European studies as well. Heinesen (2004) finds a negative relationship between young 
population and public education spending for Denmark. Using a panel data model for 1989-
1996, Borge and Rattsø (2008) show that education spending per child (7-15 years) is 
negatively correlated with the size of the population of that age group. Kempkes and Seitz 
(2005) report similar findings for western German states.  
2.3 Political factors 
Political factors are also regarded as important determinants of public spending on education. 
Many past studies show that factors such as the political ideology of the ruling party 
determine the level of government intervention in the economy and thus influence 
government decisions regarding expenditure on development (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987; 
Boix, 1998). 6  Besides political ideology, corruption can be another crucial determinant. 
Corruption affects the public provision of social services such as health and education (Gupta 
et al., 2000). The more the corruption in a particular state, the more the government in that 
state will be potentially inclined to spend in sectors such as infrastructure projects where 
corruption opportunities are abundant, rather than on education where the opportunities are 
much more limited (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1998). 
Hence, we control for economic, demographic and political variables while assessing the 
determining factors for public education spending in Indian states. The econometric model 
used in the paper has been explained in the following section. 
3. Model Specification and Variable Description 
 
We conduct our analysis using data on 16 Indian states from 2001-2010. Other states could 
not be included because of data limitations. However, it should be noted that our sample 
includes all the major states of India and covers about 91% of the total population. 
Per capita state expenditure on education has been used as the dependent variable in our 
model. We do not work with the absolute value of the education expenditure in order to 
control for the state size. For example, larger states like Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh 
spend more on education compared to smaller states such as Kerala and Himachal Pradesh in 
                                                          
6Boix (1998), for example, says that while social democrats and conservatives both seek growth, each adopts 
different policies. The “left” uses public investment in human and physical capital to achieve growth while the 
“right” reduces taxes and government involvement in the economy to boost private sector involvement for 
growth. 
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absolute terms. However, the picture is quite the opposite if we look at the per capita 
expenditure which, we believe, is a more effective indicator than aggregate values (see Table 
2). 
The initial econometric model used in this paper looks as follows:  
LEDEXPpcit=β0+β1LEDEXPpcit-1+β2LNSDPpcit+β3LTAXpcit+β4LGRANTpcit+ 
β5LOANpcit+β6RIGHTit+β7LEFTit+β6REGIONALit+β7TREND+eit   (1) 
where, in state i and year t, 
‘EDEXPpc’ is education expenditure per capita by state government (2001 constant prices), 
‘NSDPpc’ is Net State Domestic Product per capita at 1999-2000 constant prices, ‘TAXpc’ is 
state’s own tax revenue per capita (2001 constant prices), ‘GRANTpc’ and ‘LOANpc’ are 
respectively grants per capita and loans per capita received from central government (2001 
constant prices).7We initially used ‘Ideological competition’ as the political control in our 
model. Our classification of parties along the line of ideology is broadly based on Chhibber 
and Nooruddin (2004). The Indian National Congress (INC) party has been classified as a 
‘CENTRIST’ party. Any state ruled by the communist parties or Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
has been coded as ‘LEFT’ or ‘RIGHT’ respectively. A state ruled by any of the regional 
parties is coded as ‘Regional’. Classification of the states in this manner enables us to see the 
comparative impact of the different types of ideological competition on the public 
expenditure on education. The “Ideological Competition” enters our model as dummy 
variables called ‘CENTRIST’, ‘LEFT’, ‘RIGHT’ and ‘REGIONAL’ where ‘CENTRIST’ is 
the control category which takes the value of 1 if the Congress party is in power and 0 
otherwise. Similarly, the other dummy variables can be defined.  
A ‘CENTRIST’ or a ‘LEFT’ party can be hypothetically expected to invest more in education 
(more pro-poor policies and hence higher expenditure on social sectors) compared to a 
‘RIGHT’ party. Also, since independence, Congress has been in the power for most of the 
time so it may be expected that when the other parties (BJP, left parties and regional parties) 
come to power they may want to expand their influence over the state bureaucracy. Such 
behaviour then should possibly lead to allocation of more funds towards administration, in 
                                                          
7‘LOANpc’ can also be regarded as a political variable because loans are often negotiated politically between 
Centre and state and repayment is sometimes waived. The variable is defined as gross loans from Centre minus 
repayment of loans to the Centre. 
See Table 7 in the Appendix for data sources. 
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turn, lowering developmental expenditure (Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004). Hence, given 
Congress or ‘CENTRIST’ is the control category, we expect the coefficients on ‘RIGHT’, 
‘LEFT’ and ‘Regional’ to be negative. We also include a time trend (‘TREND’) in our model.  
All the economic variables are expressed in their natural logarithms apart from ‘LOANpc’ 
since this variable takes the value of zero for some states in some years. So we kept the 
variable in levels to avoid losing observations. The estimation results of Equation 1 are 
reported in Table 5. 
We also wanted to use child population share (defined as % of total population below 14 
years) as a control for the demographic features of a state in Equation 1. But this variable 
could not be included because data is not available for all years (Population Census is 
conducted every ten years in India).  However, a scatterplot analysis reveals that there might 
be a negative correlation between child population and per capita education spending in India.  
Figure 1: Child Population and Per Capita Public Education Expenditure Scatterplot 
 
Note: Authors’ own calculations. Per capita public education expenditure is the Y variable and percentage of 
population below 14 years of age is the X variable. Both variables are expressed in their natural logarithm. The 
year is 2001. 
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States which spend the least on education such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh 
are also among the most populous states. The high-performing states such as Kerala, 
Himachal Pradesh and Punjab have some of the lowest child population shares in the sample. 
Table 4: Ranking the States by Child Population and Per Capita Public Education 
Expenditure (EDEXPpc) in 2001-02 
State Child 
Population 
Poprank EDEXPpc Edurank 
Bihar 42.1 1 371.2 15 
Uttar Pradesh 41.1 2 381.9 14 
Rajasthan 40.1 3 634.3 10 
Madhya Pradesh 38.6 4 325.7 16 
Assam 37.4 5 981 2 
Haryana 36 6 702.7 8 
West Bengal 33.3 7 541.2 12 
Orissa 33.2 8 424.2 13 
Gujarat 32.8 9 770.2 7 
Andhra Pradesh 32.1 10 554.9 11 
Maharashtra 32.1 10 846.6 5 
Karnataka 31.9 11 681.8 9 
Punjab 31.4 12 943.2 4 
Himachal Pradesh 31.1 13 1554.4 1 
Tamil Nadu 27 14 794.4 6 
Kerala 26.1 15 948.9 3 
Note: Data on Child Population is obtained from Census of India, 2001. Poprank and Edurank refer to the ranks 
assigned to states according to the size of child population and per capita public education on expenditure 
respectively. A lower rank means a larger child population. 
However, based on these one year statistics, we cannot comment on causality. Similar 
problems occurred when we tried to include ‘corruption’ as a political or institutional control 
in our econometric model. To our knowledge, the only available corruption index for Indian 
states was constructed by Transparency International for the year 2005.8 We still wanted to 
include this variable in our analysis because corruption is a significant problem in India and 
its level varies significantly from state to state. 9  For example, states such as Bihar and 
Madhya Pradesh are amongst the most corrupt states. Conversely, Kerala and Himachal 
Pradesh, who spend the highest on education, are the least corrupt states (see Figure 2). 
                                                          
8 The study, covering a total of 14,405 respondents from 20 Indian states, aimed to capture the level of “petty 
corruption” that the common man faced in obtaining 11 different public services such as Education (up to 12th 
Std.), Police, Land Records & Registration, Electricity, Water Supply, Government Hospitals, Income Tax, 
Public Distribution System, Judiciary, Municipal Services and Rural Financial Institutions. The indices were 
constructed using both the perception of corruption and actual experiences of paying bribes for obtaining public 
services. The respondent’s perceptions and experiences of corruption were assigned weights of 40 and 60 
percent respectively. See Table 9 in Appendix for the ranking of Indian states by this study. 
9  In 2012, India was ranked at 94th position out of 176 countries (Corruption Perception Index 2012, 
Transparency International). 
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Figure 2: Corruption and Per Capita Public Education Expenditure Scatterplot 
 
Note: The X variable, ‘Corruption’, stands for the Corruption Index constructed by the TI-CMS Indian 
Corruption Study (2005) for Indian states. Per capita public education expenditure has been expressed in natural 
logs. The year is 2005.  Some state ranks in the graph may not match with the TI-CMS ranking. This is because 
the TI-CMS study works with 20 states but we have 16 of them in our sample. Accordingly, we modified the 
ranks keeping the relative positions of states fixed. 
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the same over a span of a decade (ten years). However, with such time invariant variables in 
the model, the fixed effects method becomes ineffective. The random effects model also 
could not be used because it assumes that the individual (or, time invariant) effects are 
uncorrelated with other explanatory variables. If that assumption is not met, the estimator 
becomes inconsistent. An alternative approach is to add the group means of the independent 
variables (which vary within groups) to the model. This technique was proposed by Mundlak 
(1978) as a way to relax the aforesaid assumption in the random-effects estimator. 
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In a general form, a random effects model can be written as  
yit=αt+βxit+ci+uit    (2) 
where, xit is the explanatory variable, ci is the time-invariant individual effect and uit is the 
error term. A random effects estimation requires Cov(ci, xit) = 0 which is unlikely in our case 
since there is high probability that corruption level will be correlated with variables like state 
income. According to Mundlak (1978), if Cov(uit, xit) ≠ 0 then 
ci= Ω + δx̄i+ ai     (3) 
where, x̄i= group mean of the explanatory variable. 
Plugging (3) into (2), we get 
yit= αt+βxit+ δx̄i+ai+uit   (4) 
where, Ω gets absorbed into the time intercepts. 
So, we re-estimate our model using this approach in order to include controls for demography 
and corruption. Our final model is expressed as follows.10 
LEDEXPpcit= β0 + β1LNSDPpcit + β2LTAXpcit + β3LGRANTpcit + β4LOANpcit + 
β5Mean_LNSDPpci + β6Mean_LTAXpci + β7Mean_LGRANTpci + β8Mean_LOANpci + 
β9LPOPi  + β10CORRUPTIONi  +  eit  (5) 
where, ‘LPOP’ and ‘CORRUPTION’ stand for child population share (0 to 14 years) and TI-
CMS Corruption Index for Indian states respectively. 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Initial Model Estimation (Equation 1) 
We start by checking whether Random Effects model (REM) or Fixed Effects model (FEM) 
should be used. The Hausman test ruled in favour of the FEM. But we detected the problem 
of first order autocorrelation in our FEM estimation results so we do not draw any inference 
from our FEM results and instead we re-estimate the model using Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) method. FGLS method allows estimation in the presence of first-order 
                                                          
10 We do find any evidence that political ideology of the ruling party influences education spending by state 
governments (see results in the next section) and consequently we drop it from the final model, Equation 5.  
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autocorrelation within panels, heteroskedasticity or cross-sectional correlation across panels. 
However, there can be potential reverse causality bias in our FGLS results if there is a 
causality running from state education expenditure towards economic growth. In that case, 
NSDPpc will not be exogenous anymore and the results obtained will not be reliable for 
drawing any inference. So, we also estimate an Instrumental Variable Regression using two-
stage least squares (2SLS) method to control for the potential reverse causality. The 
econometric results are presented below. 
Table 5: Panel Model Estimation Results: 2001-2010 
Independent 
Variable 
Fixed Effects 
Model 
(I) 
Feasible 
GLS 
Regression 
(II) 
IV(2SLS) 
Regression  
(III) 
IV(2SLS) 
Regression  
(IV) 
LEDEXPpc(-1) 0.17*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 
LNSDPpc 0.28 0.34*** 0.91** 0.93*** 
LTAXpc 0.07 0.03 -0.21 -0.13 
LGRANTpc 0.08 0.21*** 0.06 0.07 
LOANpc 0.00** 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 
RIGHT 0.02 -0.02 -0.02  
LEFT -0.13*** -.02 -0.12  
REGIONAL -0.02 0.00 0.01  
TREND 0.03* 0.01 0.01  
CONSTANT 1.43 -0.78**   
 Hausman Test 
H0:REM preferred 
P-value=0.00 
 
Woolridge Test 
for 
Autocorrelation 
H0: No first-order 
autocorrelation 
P-value=0.01 
 
Pesaran’s Test of 
cross-sectional 
independence 
H0:No 
cross-sectional 
dependence 
P-value=0.30 
 LSDPpc is instrumented 
using own 1st and 2nd 
year lagged values. 
 
Underidentification test 
H0: Model 
is underidentified 
P-value=0.00 
 
Hansen's J test 
H0:Instruments are valid 
P-value=0.13 
 
Joint Test of 
Significance (from 
III) 
H0: RIGHT=0 
       LEFT=0 
       REGIONAL=0 
P-value=0.57 
 
Underidentification 
test 
H0:Model 
is underidentified 
P-value=0.00 
 
Hansen's J test 
H0: Instruments are  
      valid 
P-value=0.12 
 
Note: Dependent Variable:  Education Expenditure per capita by the state government.  
Number of observations is 159 in FEM and FGLS estimation and 128 in IV estimation.  
A trend variable has been included in the model. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used for FEM and 
IV estimation. According to Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) estimates, our model does not suffer from the 
multicollinearity problem. 
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Education expenditure by the state governments increases with an increase in state income 
(NSDPpc).  Loans from centre also come out to be a statistically significant determinant of 
education expenditure however the effect seems to be negligible. The effect of political 
ideology seems to be fragile in expenditure decisions which are consistent with Chhibber and 
Nooruddin (2004) who also try to assess whether political ideologies matter in the context of 
spending decisions by state governments in India. We find some evidence that “LEFT” 
parties-led state governments spend less than Congress-led state governments on education 
but the result is sensitive to different estimation methods. The political ideology variables 
jointly also came out to be statistically insignificant in IV estimation and were consequently 
dropped from the final model (see Equation 5). 
A major drawback of these methods (FEM, FGLS and IV 2SLS) is that we could not include 
controls for demographic characteristics and corruption in our model. Therefore, we refrain 
from deriving any conclusion from the results presented in Table 5 since there is ample 
international evidence, as discussed in the previous section, that factors such as demographic 
characteristics play a significant role in determining public spending.   
4.2 Final Model Estimation (Mundlak’s Approach) 
We incorporate child population share and TI-CMS corruption index as proxies for 
demography and corruption respectively in our model and re-estimate using Mundlak’s 
approach (see Equation 5 above).11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11See Table 10 in the Appendix where we re-run the Mundlak model using elderly population share as an 
alternate proxy for demographic characteristics. In case of Indian states, elderly population share does not exert 
any influence on public education expenditure. 
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Table 6: Final Model Estimation Results: Mundlak’s Approach 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
LNSDPpc 0.50*** 
LTAXpc 0.31** 
LGRANTpc 0.11** 
LOANpc 0.00*** 
Mean_LNSDPpc -0.28 
Mean_LTAXpc -0.00 
Mean_LGRANTpc 0.23*** 
Mean_LOANpc -0.00*** 
LPOP -0.76* 
CORRUPTION 0.00 
CONSTANT 2.82 
Joint Test of Significance  
H0: LMNSDPpc, LMTAXpc, LMGRANTpc 
      and LMLOANpc  are jointly equal to 0 
P-value=0.00 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent Variable:  Education Expenditure per capita by the state government. LPOP and 
CORRUPTION are the time invariant variables. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. 
 
The finding, NSDP per capita is a significant determinant of public education expenditure, is 
robust to different model specifications and estimation methods. Other economic variables 
such as tax revenue and grants received from centre also increase spending on education 
significantly. There is a negative association between per capita education expenditure and 
share of child population. In other words, a larger share of children (0 to14 years) in total 
population is one of the reasons why states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan spend less on education compared to the rest of the Indian states. As we saw earlier 
in Table 2, these states are lagging behind most of the other states in terms of economic 
growth too. Based on these findings, it can probably be asserted that the future of India’s 
demographic dividend looks dim. That is because the population of the rich states are slowly 
aging and the fastest growth in the working age population is going to take place in Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh after Haryana over the next two decades. Uttar Pradesh, 
Bihar and Madhya Pradesh will have roughly one-third (around 31.3%) of India’s working 
population in 2026 (Thakur, 2012).12 Further investment in education is needed in these states 
to reap the benefits of this growing working age population.13 This, in turn, will translate into 
higher human capital stock and ensure faster economic growth in future.  
                                                          
12 See Table 8 in the Appendix. 
13 Kumar (2010) also highlights this issue. 
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Corruption does not seem to affect education expenditure in Indian states. We tried to use 
administrative expenditure and expenditure on wage and salaries by state governments (each 
measured as percentage of total state expenditure) as alternate proxies for corruption because 
it can be presumed that more the corrupt a government, more will be its expenditure on 
unproductive investments. However, none of these two expenditure shares seem to have a 
statistically significant impact on public expenditure on education and were consequently 
dropped from the model. 14 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The paper tries to identify the determinants of education expenditure in 16 Indian states for 
the time period 2001-2010 using panel model analysis. The econometric findings indicate 
that richer states spend more compared to the poorer ones. Other economic variables such as 
tax revenue and grants from the central government also exert a positive impact on education 
expenditure. 
We do not find any evidence that political ideology of the ruling party affects education 
spending decisions in Indian states. The paper also considers other political factors like 
corruption which can be hypothetically expected to lower public welfare spending in areas 
such as education. A scatterplot analysis reveals a weak correlation between education 
spending and corruption. Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, who spend the lowest on education, are 
also among the most corrupt states. Conversely, the high performers like Kerala and 
Himachal Pradesh are the least corrupt states. However, our econometric analysis does not 
find evidence in support of this correlation.  
There is a negative association between child population share (0-14 years, as percentage of 
total population) and education expenditure. The states with the largest share of child 
population in India are Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. These are also the poorest 
states in India with the most underinvested education sectors in the country. Over the next 
two decades, these states will experience the fastest growth in the working age population 
among all the Indian states. Given this scenario, it can be argued that the future prospects of 
India’s Demographic Dividend look dim. The governments in those states need to implement 
                                                          
14We also wanted to use income inequality as a proxy for corruption. For a detailed discussion on how income 
inequality can lead to corruption in democratic states, see You and Khagram (2004). But Charron (2010) does 
not find inequality to be a significant determinant of corruption in Indian states. So, we do not include this 
variable in our study. 
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widespread reforms in the education sector to reap the benefits of this growing youth 
population.  
One may argue that, in India’s case, there is ample empirical evidence that private schools are 
more efficient than public schools in imparting learning (Desai et al, 2008; French and 
Kingdon, 2010; Pal and Kingdon, 2010). Hence the expected policy implication should be to 
let more private schools to be opened, instead of focusing on education expenditure by state 
governments. However, private schools charge a fee which families from poor economic 
backgrounds struggle to pay. Private schools, just like any other private enterprise, operate 
for profits and so it is unlikely that such schools will open in poor and backward areas of the 
country. It is not unusual when Pal (2010) finds that private schools are more likely to be 
present in villages with better off households and better infrastructural facilities. In a 
developing country like India, where, in 2010, 32.7% of the population was still below the 
poverty line15  (World Development Indicators, 2012) and 26% of the children of lower 
secondary school age could not attend school (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2010) it is the 
government which has to ensure access to education for all. This will also help achieve 
“universal elementary education” (one of the Millennium Development Goals, MDGs) and 
ensure more inclusive growth in the long run.  
Finally, we acknowledge the fact that increasing education expenditure per se will not 
guarantee an increase in human capital stock and a higher economic growth rate. The quality 
of education is equally important, which has to be ensured by providing sufficient number of 
qualified teachers in public schools, teaching aids, sufficient textbooks (with other learning 
aids) and other necessary amenities. But even to ensure good quality, raising the level of 
public expenditure in education is absolutely essential (Ghosh, 2011). 
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Appendix 
State list 
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,  Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West 
Bengal 
Table 7: Data Source 
Variable Source 
Education expenditure by state governments Reserve Bank of India (RBI) database 
Net State Domestic Product Reserve Bank of India (RBI) database 
Grants and Loans from Centre Reserve Bank of India (RBI) database 
State’s Tax Revenue RBI publications, various issues 
‘Political Ideology’ variables Election Commission of India website 
Demographic Variables Census of India, 2001 and 2011 
Corruption Index India Corruption Study 2005, Transparency 
International India 
 
Table 8: Distribution of India’s Working Age Population (WAP) in 2026 
State Share of WAPas % of India's total WAP 
population 
Uttar Pradesh 16.95 
Bihar 8.11 
Madhya Pradesh 6.22 
Haryana 2.31 
Himachal Pradesh 0.55 
Maharashtra 9.74 
Kerala 2.60 
Source: Thakur (2012). 
Note: Choice of states based on our ranking of states in terms of per capita education spending by state 
governments. No data is available for Assam. 
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Table 9: Ranking of States on Corruption 
State Rank 
Kerala 1 
Himachal Pradesh 2 
Gujarat 3 
Andhra Pradesh 4 
Maharashtra 5 
Chhattisgarh 6 
Punjab 7 
West Bengal 8 
Orissa 9 
Uttar Pradesh 10 
Delhi 11 
Tamil Nadu 12 
Haryana 13 
Jharkhand 14 
Assam 15 
Rajasthan 16 
Karnataka 17 
Madhya Pradesh 18 
Jammu & Kashmir 19 
Bihar 20 
Source: TI-CMS Indian Corruption  Study (2005). 
Note: Higher rank denotes lower corruption and vice versa 
Table 10: Mundlak Model Results with Elderly Population as proxy for demographic structure 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
LNSDPpc 0.50** 
LTAXpc 0.31** 
LGRANTpc 0.11** 
LOANpc 0.00*** 
Mean_LNSDPpc -0.18 
Mean_LTAXpc -0.07 
Mean_LGRANTpc 0.23*** 
Mean_LOANpc -0.00*** 
LELDERLY 0.43 
CORRUPTION 0.00 
CONSTANT -1.22 
Joint Test of Significance 
H0: LMNSDPpc, LMTAXpc, LMGRANTpc 
and LMLOANpc  are jointly equal to 0 
P-value=0.00 
 
 
 
Note:LELDERLY= Fraction of elderly population (aged above 60 years) in total population expressed in 
natural logarithm.Dependent Variable:  Education Expenditure per capita by the state government.LELDERLY 
and CORRUPTION are the time invariant variables.  
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
